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APPELLANT'S OPENING
BRIEF

i

Priority No. 2

i

Case No. 970471-CA
Trial Court No. 941400117

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal by Wesley James Long ("Long") from the
judgment and conviction of two counts of Child Abuse, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(2)(a)
(1993). This Court obtains jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1997).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A«

Issues

1.

In this case involving child abuse, was counsel

constitutionally ineffective by failing to object to the admissions
of:
(a)

a police report

indicating

that Long was

investigated (not convicted) for assaulting his ex-wife who is
not the victim of the charged offenses?

(b)

evidence of Long's prior felony convictions

(attempted burglary and kidnapping)?
(c)

evidence

of Long's uncharged

misconduct

or

"other bad acts" allegedly perpetrated on people other than
the abused victim?
2.

Was it plain error for the trial court to admit the

above described

evidence, even though trial counsel raised

no

objection?
3.

Do

cumulative

evidentiary

errors warrant

a

new

4.

Were erroneous admissions of the evidence harmless?

5.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying

trial?

Long's motion for arrest of judgment and/or new trial?

B.

Standards
1.

of Appellate
The

trial

Review
court

ruled

on

Long's

ineffective

assistance of counsel and plain error claims subsequent to a motion
for new trial hearing.

See R.618,621,699,1191

& Addendum IV.1

Therefore, the ineffectiveness claim presents a mixed question of
law and fact, such that the trial court's factual findings deserves
some deference in this Court.

However, the legal conclusions of

the court below are reviewed de novo, for correction of error.
1

See

The denial of the motion to arrest judgment and/or for
new trial calls for abuse of discretion standard review. See
State
v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938 (Utah 1994). However, the underlying
substantive claims resulting in the denial of the motion are
reviewed as discussed below.
- 2 -

State

v. Classon,

935 P.2d 524, 531, 312 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 30-31

(Utah Ct. App. 1997); State

v. Perry,

899 P.2d 1232, 1238 (Utah Ct.

App. 1995).
2.

(a) Admissions of the uncharged misconduct and

prior crimes evidence call for a no-deference, correction of error
See State

standard of review.

v. Doporto,

935 P.2d 484, 488-90,

308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 19-21 (Utah 1997).
(b)

The plain error analysis requires this Court to view

the trial record as a whole to determine if the claim errors
seriously affected the fairness of the trial. See State
925 P.2d 937, 939 (Utah 1996); State
& nn.7-12 (Utah), cert,
3.

denied,

v. Eldredge,

v.

Labrum,

773 P.2d 29, 35

493 U.S. 814, 110 S. Ct. 62 (1989).

The harmless error standard asks this Court to

review whether the claimed error had substantial and injurious
effect on the jury verdict, i.e., whether there is a reasonable
likelihood that the outcome would have been different absent the
error.

See United

States

725, 732 (1986); State
1995); State
4.

v. Emmett,

v.
v.

Lane,

Villarreal,

474 U.S. 438, 449, 106 S.Ct.
889 P.2d 419, 425 (Utah

839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah 1992).

The issue relating to cumulative evidentiary errors

requires this Court to consider whether there is a reasonable
likelihood of a more favorable verdict absent the errors. State
Rimmasch,

115 P.2d 388, 407 (Utah 1989); State

1336, 1338 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

- 3 -

v. Braun,

v.

787 P.2d

C.

Preservation

of Issues

and Propriety

of Review

These issues initially were not preserved in the court
below, as trial counsel could

not have preserved

ineffectiveness for appellate review.

See State

P.2d 578, 580 n.3 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,

denied,

1993) .

v.

their own

Garrett,

849

860 P.2d 943 (Utah

However, present counsel filed a motion for new trial

(R.465) , in which the issues were raised and then ruled upon by the
trial court. See R.618, 621, 699,1175; cf.

Classon,

935 P.2d at 531,

312 UAR at 30-31 (issue properly preserved where trial court ruled
on ineffective claim on Rule 23B remand).
In the alternative, this Court could apply the plain
error doctrine to counsel's failure to preserve the foregoing
issues. See Utah R. Evid. 103(d); Eldredge,
12; State

v. Sepulveda,

773 P.2d at 35 & nn.7-

842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and
rules cited below, are reproduced

in the following order at

Addendum I:
Sixth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Article I, Section
12 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109; Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure Rule 30;, Utah Rules of Evidence 103, 401,
403, 404, 607, 608, 609.

- 4 -

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the
The

Case

State charged

Long

in

a two-count

Information

alleging child abuse (R.4-6). Count I alleges that between January
20, 1990, and February 4, 1990, Long intentionally or knowingly
inflicted serious physical injury upon WJL, a child under the age
of 18, in that he violently shook WJL (who was then between 2 and
4 weeks of age), resulting in serious and permanent brain damage
and impairment of neurological function•

This is a second degree

felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2)(a) (1993).
Count II charges that between April and May 5, 1990, Long
intentionally or knowingly inflicted serious physical injury upon
WJL (who was then three months old), breaking four of WJL's ribs
and also causing him respiratory distress, a second degree felony,
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-109(2) (a) (1993) . See R.4-6.
B.

Course of

Proceedings

On April 28, 1994, the State moved in limine for the
admission of evidence of other bad acts allegedly perpetrated by
Long

(R.44-68),

to

which

the

defense

objected

(R.89-108).

Thereafter, a jury trial commencing October 23, 1995, came to an
abrupt end because of a mistrial ordered as a result of counsel's
medical condition (R.136-140, 146).

- 5 -

Subsequently, on February 2, 6, 7 and 8, 1996, Long
underwent

another

jury

trial

(R.223-229),

at

which

he

was

eventually convicted as charged (R.221-222).
C.

Disposition
On

in Trial
June

7,

Court
1996, the district

court

ordered

Long

committed to the Utah State Prison for a sixty-day evaluation
(R.460-463). Thereafter, on September 5, 1996, the court sentenced
Long on the convictions to two concurrent, indeterminate prison
terms of one to fifteen (1-15) years (R.578-580,1140-41).2
Subsequently, the court denied Long's motion for a new
trial, but granted his motion for a certificate of probable cause
pursuant

to

Rule

(R.700,712,1175).
JD.

Statement

27(f),

Utah

Rules

of

Criminal

Procedure

This appeal then followed.

of the

Facts

In the light most favorable to the jury verdict, the
evidence reveals the following:3

2

The judgment and commitment order is also designated
"minute entry," which generally is not an appealable order.
However, the judgment and commitment order and the order denying
the motion for new trial here contain the "final" order of the
district court. See Addenda II & IV.
3

See State
v. Hamilton,
827 P. 2d 232, 233 (Utah 1992)
(requiring that appellate court review verdict evidence in the
light most favorable to the jury's decision). However, Long will
present conflicting evidence "to the extent necessary to clarify
the issues raised on appeal." Classon,
935 P.2d at 531, 312 UAR at
27.
- 6 -

The State's

1.

a.

Case in Chief

Medical Testimony

On the first day of trial, Dr. Marion Walker, a pediatric
surgeon at Salt Lake Primary Children's Hospital, who had been
asked to review WJL's medical record, testified that the injuries
the child suffered, resulting in lasting permanent damage to his
brain, were a result of trauma and non-accidental in nature.

He

opined that the injuries were neither prenatal nor perinatal, but
were caused by violent shaking, popularly referred to as "Shaken
Baby Syndrome" (R.1013-1014 [Tr.144-146]) .4 Dr. Walker said WJL's
fractured ribs were also a result of a direct and heavy force
applied by an adult, and could not have been caused by a fall from
a couch (R.1009 [Tr.160]).

Jumping onto a child/s chest with a

foot or knee, Dr. Walker concluded, could be the type of force
applied to WJL's chest that caused an injury of this nature (R.1007
[Tr.171]).
Dr. Thale Smith testified on the second day of trial.
Dr. Smith had treated WJL at the time of birth in January 1990,
when he was born prematurely and with breathing problems (R.1114
[Tr.209]).

Dr. Smith would later see WJL periodically over the

course of the next several weeks for breathing-related problems
(R.1113-1114 [Tr.210-212]). At one point WJL became "apnea," that

4

The trial transcript is paginated backward in the
appellate record. For clarity purposes, Long will cite to the
record as well as the original transcript pages.
- 7 -

is, stopped breathing completely because of severe brain swelling.
Eventually, a neurosurgeon was called to drain fluid from the
child's brain to relieve the cranial pressure (R.1113 [Tr.213214]).
Dr. Smith again saw WJL in May 1990, due to the broken
ribs injury, which he opined was caused by a sustained force or
some sort of applied compression sufficient to break the resilience
of the ribs.

After seeing the broken ribs injury, the doctor

opined that WJL's neurological problems must also have stemmed from
shaken baby syndrome (R.1112 [Tr.216-217]).
Dr.

Richard

Boyer,

a

pediatric

radiologist,

also

testified for the State. Dr. Boyer had not personally treated WJL,
but had reviewed the X-rays, CT and MRI scans conducted on the
child (R.1109 [Tr.229-230]) .

Like Dr. Walker, Dr. Boyer opined

that WJL's neurological problems were not perinatal but a result of
violent shaking (R.1104 [Tr.249]).

He also testified that the

broken ribs were caused by a severe force generated by squeezing or
compression of the chest, of the type a normally muscled adult,
male or female, could produce (R.1105 [Tr.246]).
b.

Lay Testimony
i.

The Crime

Long's former wife, Jamie Kastenbader, testified February
6 on behalf of the State. Ms. Kastenbader was married to Long from
March 1988 to December 1990, during which time the couple had two
- 8 -

children: Nessia, born November 1988, and WJL, born January 1990.
Ms. Kastenbader eventually gave up her parental rights to the two
children in December 1991 (R.1043,1017 [Tr.26,130]).
As to Count I, Ms. Kastenbader testified that on January
27, 1990, Nessia and WJL were at home with Long in Springville,
Utah, while she was doing laundry at her mother's home in Orem,
Utah.

She came home and found WJL laying in his bassinet (R.1041

[Tr.35]).

Later in the evening, Long told Ms. Kastenbader that he

would get up at night and feed WJL because Ms. Kastenbader needed
to rest (R.1040 [Tr.37]).
When Ms. Kastenbader woke up the following morning,
January

28, she saw Long standing over the bassinet.

Long

explained to Ms. Kastenbader that WJL had never woke up the
previous night.

At this point, Ms. Kastenbader checked WJL and

observed bruising marks on his face (R.1040 [Tr.37-38]).

When

asked about the bruise, Long explained that Nessia had pulled WJL
off the couch the previous day when Ms. Kastenbader was doing the
laundry at her mother's house (R.1040 [Tr.38]) . WJL was then taken
to the hospital and released by doctors after being examined
(R.1041 [Tr.40]).
Thereafter, according to Ms. Kastenbader, on Sunday,
February 4, 1990, Ms. Kastenbader, Long, WJL, Nessia and Curtis —
Long's two-year-old son from a previous relationship — were all in
their trailer home in Springville (R.1039 [Tr.40-41]).

At some

point that day, Ms. Kastenbader began preparing dinner in the
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kitchen, while Nessia and Curtis were playing around the house. At
this time, Long was sitting in the living room, and beside him was
WJL

in a bassinet

(R.1039

[Tr.42-43]).

Approximately

thirty

minutes later, Long held WJL in his arms and said the child was not
breathing very well (R.1039 [Tr.43]). WJL was thereafter taken to
the hospital where he stayed for five days (R.1038 [Tr.44]).
Regarding Count II, Ms. Kastenbader testified that on May
4, 1990, the couple and their children were staying at the home of
Long's parents, where they had

a downstairs

bedroom

(R.1037

[Tr.48]). Ms. Kastenbader, the children, and other family members
were at home that Friday evening.

Long was not home, having gone

to work on a second shift (R.1037 [Tr.49]).

Long returned home at

night when Ms. Kastenbader and the children were getting ready to
go to bed.

At this point, Long agreed to feed WJL, so that Ms.

Kastenbader and Nessia could sleep.
Long then took WJL with him to watch television in the
family room, located on the same floor. Shortly before she went to
sleep, Ms. Kastenbader heard a "squeal or like a screech."

Ms.

Kastenbader did not see WJL until the following morning, May 5,
when she saw red dots on his face.

She also noticed that WJL's

feeding tube had been removed, which tube normally was in his mouth
and taped to his face (R.1037 [Tr.50J).
WJL was then taken to the hospital.

The following day,

May 6, doctors advised Ms. Kastenbader that the child had suffered
broken ribs (R.1036 [Tr.52]).

When Ms. Kastenbader got home and
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confronted Long about the broken ribs, Long opined, among other
things, that WJL must have a rare bone disease (R.1036 [Tr.55]).
ii.

Other Bad Acts Evidence Admitted

Ms. Kastenbader related to the jury that when they were
married, Long was not a good father to Nessia, that he beat her all
the time, pulled her ponytail, and spanked her for various little
things the child did.

Ms. Kastenbader also said Long told her

almost every day after she became pregnant with WJL that she needed
to get an abortion (R.1042-1043 [Tr.27-30]). One day, in December
1989, an argument ensued between the two at Long's parents' home,
and Long pushed her down the basement stairs, causing her to go
into premature

labor

(R.1042

[Tr.29,31]).

According to Ms.

Kastenbader, though unsupported by medical opinion, WJL was thus
born with severe lung problems (R.1041 [Tr.32-33]).
Maggie

Blackburn,

Ms.

Kastenbader's

friend,

also

testified about the uncharged abuse perpetrated by Long on Nessia.
Ms. Blackburn said she was present when Long pulled Nessia's hair
and beat her.

She was also there when Long pushed Ms. Kastenbader

down the stairs (R.1001 [Tr.193-195]) .
On cross-examination, counsel asked if Ms. Kastenbader
had been accused in October 1990 of breaking Nessia's arm and
inflicting on the child wounds that appeared to be cigarette burns
(R.1017,1027 [Tr.90-91,128]). The State objected (R.1027 [Tr.91]),
on

the

ground

that

the

question
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called

for

prejudicial,

inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence (R.1024,1025 [Tr.98,102]).
At this point, the court sustained the objection, stating
"we are not trying or attempting to retry any kind of a case with
regard to Nessia. We are here with regard to the abuse of a young
boy —

W[JL]

"

(R.1022 [Tr.109]).

Counsel then reminded the

court that it had admitted similar other bad acts evidence against
Long through Ms. Kastenbader's testimony that Long was abusive of
Nessia.

The court responded that counsel posited no objection to

Ms. Kastenbader's prejudicial, objectionable testimony

(R.1022

[Tr.109]).
2.

The

Defense

Long testified on his own behalf on the second day of
trial. He denied ever having abused any of his children, or pushed
Ms. Kastenbader down the stairs during her pregnancy

(R.1100

[Tr.263]). Regarding the allegation relating to brain damage, Long
explained that on January 27, 1990, while with Nessia in the
kitchen preparing her bottle, he discovered that the girl had left
and had gone into the living room where WJL had been sleeping on a
couch. When he went to the living room, he found that WJL had been
pulled off the couch.

He did not see any bruises on WJL at the

time (R.1099-1100 [Tr.265-270]) .
Long further testified he had gone on a construction job
with his father on February 4, 1990, after dropping Curtis off at
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his (Long's) parents7 home.

He returned to his parents7 home

around 4:30 p.m., picked up Curtis, and went to his house in
Springville around 5:00 p.m. (R.1098-1099 [Tr.270-272]).

When he

got home, Ms Kastenbader advised that WJL was not "acting right.11
He then picked WJL up and observed he was turning blue and
unconscious. He tried to administer CPR on WJL until the ambulance
arrived and took the child to the hospital (R.1098 [Tr.273-274]).
On the fractured ribs allegation, Long testified that the
couple and the children moved to his parents7 home in March 1990
(R.1097

[Tr.278]).

Thereafter, he began working as a crane

operator at Intermountain Galvanizing in Lindon, Utah, working the
second shift from 4:00 p.m. to midnight.

On May 5, Long finished

his shift around 12:24 a.m., and returned home around 1:15 a.m.
(R.1096 [Tr.281]). Upon returning, Long observed that everybody in
the house was asleep (R.1093 [Tr.294]). He then fell asleep, only
to be awaken around 8:00 a.m. by Ms. Kastenbader, who related that
WJL had little red dots on his face (R.1095 [Tr.284]).
Long

further

explained

that

he

did

not

tell Ms.

Kastenbader on January 28 that WJL had been pulled off the couch by
Nessia, because he Mdidn7t think it was that big of a thing," and
also because the child seemed fine at the time (R.1092 [Tr.298]).
On cross-examination, the State asked whether Long had
been convicted of felonies (R.1093 [Tr.294]). Long responded that
he was convicted in 1992 of attempted burglary and kidnapping
(R.1093 [Tr.294])o

Defense counsel then objected when the State
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asked whether the felonies were related offenses, which objection
the court sustained (R.1092 [Tr.295]).
3.

Rebuttal

Evidence

Because Long denied beating his ex-wife, or pushing her
down the stairs during her pregnancy, the State offered as rebuttal
evidence, and defense counsel

stipulated

to the foundational

element of admitting, a 1988 police report indicating that Long was
investigated (not convicted) for assaulting Ms. Kastenbader (R.1134
[Tr.408-409]).

Without any objection, the police report was

thereafter admitted by the court (R.1134 [Tr.410]).
In its closing argument, the State alluded to the police
report as substantive evidence of Long's guilt, or at least vouched
for Ms. Kastenbader's credibility, stating, "[the report], I think,
helps you to decide which of these people is telling the truth..."
(R.1131 [Tr.420]).
4.

Other Defense Witnesses

Dr. Kevin Gully, a clinical and forensic psychologist,
testified for the defense (R.1087 [Tr.318]).
appointed

in 1991 by Judge

Brown,

Dr. Gully had been

in the juvenile

court

proceedings, to file a report on whether Long and Ms. Kastenbader
had been abusing Nessia (R.1087,1082 Tr.318,336). Thereafter, Dr.
Gully spoke with Ms. Kastenbader in January 1992 over the telephone
concerning the abuse allegation. At the time, Ms. Kastenbader told
Dr. Gully that Long had never hurt Nessia, and the worst punishment
- 14 -

he had ever inflicted was to "make her cry to sleep and slap her
hand telling her 'no'" (R.1086 [Tr.321-322]) . Continued Dr. Gully,
Ms. Kastenbader also told him that her friend, Ms. Blackburn, was
"two-faced"

and

will

do

anything

if

offered

money

(R.1085

[Tr.323]).
Long's mother, Linda Long, testified that Ms. Kastenbader
asked her to tend WJL on May 4, 1990. Mrs. Long said she declined
to do so because she was tired.

She then saw WJL's head propped up

on the couch, and thereafter observed Ms. Kastenbader sit on the
child (R.1080 [Tr.346]). She also corroborated the testimony that
Long brought Curtis over to the elder Long's home on February 4,
and then went to work with his father (R.1079 [Tr.348]).
Mark Stringer, who had been appointed guardian ad litem
for WJL and Nessia, related how Ms. Kastenbader had moved out of
Utah, showed no interest in WJL, and maintained no contact with the
child after the abuse allegations surfaced in the juvenile court.
He testified that Long, however, remained locally and maintained
contact with the child (R.1075 [Tr.363]).
Mr. Stringer said he spoke to Ms. Kastenbader about the
abuse allegations on November

13, 1990.

At this time, Ms.

Kastenbader said her mother, Pam Rasmussen, had been abusive to her
and may have also abused Nessia (R.1074 [Tr.369]).

Because Long

and Ms. Kastenbader seemed puzzled about how WJL could have been
severely injured, Mr. Stringer said he told them they would never
know who abused the child (R.1073 [Tr.374]).
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Roselyn Blakelock, another guardian ad litem who had
assisted Mr. Stringer, testified that Ms, Kastenbader told her on
July 31, 1990, that her premature labor must have been caused by
the fright of seeing a boa constrictor in her cupboard, and was not
a result of a fall or push (R.1067-1068 [Tr.392-395]).

She also

said Ms. Kastenbader made numerous inconsistent statements about
what could have caused WJL's injuries (R.1067 [Tr.395]). Long, on
the other hand, gave consistent statements as to possible cause of
the injuries (R.1067 [Tr.396]).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Counsel

was

ineffective

for

not

objecting

to

the

admissions of evidence relating to a police report of an assault
investigation, prior convictions, and other uncharged misconduct
evidence.

Given that the State's case was premised solely on

circumstantial

evidence,

the

credibility

of

Kastenbader was of utmost importance to the jury.

Long

and

Ms.

Long, however,

was prejudiced by the cumulative admissions of the evidence, as the
inadmissible evidence unfavorably tipped the balance against him.
The trial court should have noticed counsel's error in
not objecting to the admissions of the highly damaging evidence.
It should have been obvious, with relation to plain error, to the
court that counsel's failure to object to the other crimes evidence
was erroneous and prejudicial.
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Further, the errors complained
prejudicial.

of were harmful and

Absent the cumulative errors, there is a reasonable

likelihood of a different outcome, because the State's case was
premised solely on the uncorroborated testimony of Long's ex-wife,
who

was

discredited

by

neutral

witnesses

and

who

had

the

opportunity and motive to commit the charged offenses.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A.
LONG WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN
COUNSEL FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF A POLICE
REPORT OF AN ALLEGED ASSAULT OF HIS EX-WIFE WHO IS NOT
THE VICTIM OF THE CHARGED CRIME.
A.

.Relevant

Facts

On cross-examination, Long denied beating his ex-wife or
pushing her down the stairs during her pregnancy.
the

State

offered,

and

defense

counsel

In "rebuttal,"

stipulated

to

the

foundational elements of admitting, a 1988 police report indicating
that Long was investigated

(not convicted) for assaulting Ms.

Kastenbader. The police report was then admitted into evidence by
the court without any objection, and used by the prosecutor in his
closing argument as substantive evidence of Long's guilt.
B.

Standard

of

Review

To successfully assert an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, a defendant must show that (i) counsel's
performance was deficient in some demonstrable manner so
as to fall below an objective standard of reasonable
professional judgment, and (ii) there is a reasonable
probability that but for the ineffective assistance, the
- 17 -

result in the proceeding would have been more favorable
to the defendant.
State
C.

v. Pascual,
Counsel's

804 P.2d 553f 555 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).5

Performance

and Prejudice

to Long

The police report of an investigation of Long in 1988 for
assaulting his ex-wife is clearly irrelevant and inadmissible on
the question whether Long abused WJL. See Utah R. Evid. 401 & 402;
State

v. Stephens,

667 P.2d 586, 587 (Utah 1983).

The State's theory presumably is that the evidence was
offered to impeach Long under Rule 607, Utah Rules of Evidence.
However, the credibility of a witness may be attacked only "by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, subject to [other]
limitations." Utah R. Evid. 608(a). Rule 608(b) goes on to state,
with emphasis added:
Specific instances of conduct of a witness, for the
purposes of attacking or supporting the witness'
credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided
in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence.
Thus, undoubtedly, the police report which did not result in Long's
conviction was inadmissible under Rule 608.6

5

See also Strickland
v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-696,
104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); Villarreal,
889 P.2d at 427; State
v.
Templin,
805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); Classon,
935 P.2d at 531,
312 UAR at 31; State v. Montes, 804 P.2d 543, 545 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) .
6

State v. Starks,
581 P. 2d 1015, 1017 (Utah 1978) ("The
better reasoned cases hold that conduct where no conviction is had
is not admissible to impeach a witness.").
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Moreover, the police report is also inadmissible under
Rules 404 and 403.7

Indeed, such evidence

is presumptively

prejudicial because of the jury's tendency to convict the accused
on the basis of perceived criminal character.8
The Utah Supreme Court recently regraded the landscape of
the admissibility of prior crimes evidence.

In State

v.

Doporto,

935 P.2d 484, 490, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (S. Ct. 1997), the
court held:
Prior crime evidence has inherent and unavoidable
inflammatory potential. Hence, the general rule stated
in the first sentence of Rule 404(b) is that prior crimes
evidence is inadmissible unless it has a special
relevance to the crimes charged by being probative of
"motive,
opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
To assure the integrity of the trial process, we hold
that evidence of prior crimes is presumed to be
inadmissible and that, prior to admitting it, the trial
court must find that (1) there is a necessity for the
prior crimes evidence, (2) it is highly probative of a
material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its special
probativeness and the necessity for it outweighs its
7

Utah R.Evid. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in
order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent..."); Utah R. Evid. 403 ("Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury . . . " ) .
8

See Doporto,
935 P.2d at 486, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22
(other bad acts witnesses' testimony was of no probative value as
to defendant's intent or motive in assaulting victim, nor was
testimony probative of defendant's common plan or scheme). Accord
State

v. Featherson,

781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989); State

v. Howell,

649

P.2d 91 (Utah 1982); State v. Goodliffe,
578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978);
State
v. Minnish,
560 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977); Starks,
581 P.2d at
1017-18.
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prejudicial effect. As stated above, we will review the
trial court's rulings on these issues more closely than
ordinary rulings on relevance and with a limited
deference (emphasis added).9
In Doporto,

the defendant allegedly sodomized A.W. when

the girl was seven years old.

Prior to trial, the State moved in

limine, under Rule 404(b), to allow six other persons to testify
that

the

defendant

occasions.

had

also

sexually

abused

them

on

other

According to the State, the witnesses' testimony was

probative of the defendant's intent, opportunity, and common scheme
or plan.

Over the defendant's objection, the trial court allowed

the State to present any two of the four witnesses which the court
deemed their testimony to be probative and not prejudicial.
Doporto,

See

935 P.2d at 486, 308 UAR at 19.
A.W., the victim of the charged crime, testified that the

defendant rubbed baby lotion on the inside of her legs and then
anally sodomized her, when she had a sleep-over at the defendant's
house. In addition, B.J.L., one of the two witnesses the State had
selected pursuant to the trial court's order, testified that she
went over to the defendant's house when she was eleven years old to
visit one of his daughters.

The daughter was not home, but the

defendant invited her to go driving.

The defendant then took her

to a remote location where he removed her clothing and then had

9

The court went on to state that necessity entails proving
an issue contested by the accused, and "probativeness" cannot be
used as a ruse for showing that the accused has criminal
propensities. See id.,
935 P.2d at 490, 308 UAR at 22.
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sexual intercourse with her. See Doporto,

935 P.2d at 486-87,

308

UAR at 19-20.
T.M., defendant's niece and the State's second other bad
acts witness, testified to two prior incidents of sexual abuse.
When she was five years old, T.M. attended a family gathering at
the defendant's home, where she was instructed by the defendant's
wife to go with the defendant and that he would give her a bath.
She said the defendant rubbed baby oil on her and then had
intercourse with her.

She also related another incident which

occurred when she was fourteen years old.

This time, at another

family gathering, the defendant came into the room where T.M. was
watching television, gave her five dollars, and unzipped her pants.
He then attempted to kiss and touch her vagina.

See Doporto,

935

P.2d at 487-88, 308 UAR at 19-20.
On appeal, the supreme court concluded that B.J.L.'s and
T.M.'s testimony was not probative of the defendant's intent or
motive for sodomizing A.W. See id.,

935 P. 2d at 493, 30 UAR at 22.

Nor was the testimony probative of opportunity to commit the
charged crime since the fact was not disputed.

See id.

The court

went on to conclude that the State had not demonstrated any common
scheme or plan, because the similarity between the charged and
uncharged crimes is so common to many assault and rape cases, such
that it is not peculiarly distinctive.

"In short, the real weight

of the prior crimes evidence went to showing a propensity to acts
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of child abuse rather than showing that Doporto committed the act
Id.,

charged."

935 P.2d at 493, 30 UAR at 22.

The court further concluded that, even if the other bad
acts had any probative value, the trial court erred in admitting
the evidence under Rule 403, on the ground that the prejudicial
effect

of

the

evidence

did

not

substantially

outweigh

its

probativeness. The supreme court noted that the prejudicial nature
of the evidence "was severe and readily apparent," and thus "far
outweighed its legitimate probative value, if any, that it had."
See Doporto,

935 P.2d at 494, 308 UAR at 23-24.

Here, too, the police report of Long's alleged assault of
Ms. Kastenbader is not necessary, nor probative of his intent or
motive for injuring WJL.

In addition, the prosecutor's reference

in his closing argument to the police report as evidence of Long's
character

(or

lack

thereof) ,

and

the

bolstering

of

Ms.

Kastenbader's credibility further highlights the problem with its
admission.10
In our adversary system, it is the responsibility of
defense counsel to object to the admission of prejudicial evidence
against his client.11

10

See

generally

Here, counsel failed to object to the

State

v.

Emmett,

839 P.2d 781, 785 (Utah

1992) (prosecutorial comment on defendant's prior conviction tilted
balance in favor of conviction where credibility was an issue).
11

See Graham, Handbook

of Federal

Evidence

§ 103.9 (2d ed.

1986 & Supp. 1996) ("Graham"); Weinstein et al., Evidence 96 (8th
ed. 1988); Imwinkelried, Evidentiary
Foundations
7, 10 (1986).
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admission of the prejudicial, inadmissible police report. Under the
Strickland

standard, counsel's performance was clearly deficient.12

See State

v.

Walters,

796

P. 2d

Hallett,

813 P.2d 857, 867 (Idaho 1990); State
701,

705

(Utah

Ct.

App.

1990)

v.

(counsel's

performance deficient in failing to object to admission of hearsay
856 P.2d 1060 (Utah 1993).13

evidence), aff'd.,

Long, however, is

aware of this Court's long-held presumption that counsel's conduct
might be considered sound trial strategy even if counsel's action
is patently unwise.14
In Julian,
counsel

failed

to

as here, the defendant contended that his
file

a motion

in

limine

and

to

object

to

presentation of evidence of other wrongful conduct on the part of
the defendant.

However, after reviewing the record, the supreme

court concluded that:

12

The ABA Standards "furnish a reliable guide for
determining the responsibilities of defense counsel...."
Marzullo
v. State
of Maryland,
561 F.2d 540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977). The ABA
Standard Relating to Defense Function provides that a lawyer should
follow proper procedures, entering appropriate motions and
objections to protect the rights of the accused. See ABA
Standards
for Criminal
Justice,
"The Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 &
Supp. 1986).
13

But see State
v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987)
(quoted case omitted) ("'Decisions as to what objections to make
... are generally left to the professional judgment of counsel'");
State
v. Julian,
111 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1989) (same).
14

See, e.g. State
v. Tennyson,
850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah Ct.
App. 1993) ("[A]n ineffective assistance claim succeeds only when
no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy can be surmised from
counsel's actions.").
- 23 -

counsel made a conscious decision to allow introduction
of the testimony in question in order to demonstrate the
theory that defendant's wife had abnormal reactions to
and preoccupation with sexual matters, which explained a
poor marital relationship, and led to manipulate and
corrupt the children and cause the fabrication of their
testimony.
While counsel conceivably took a risk by
allowing discussion of defendant's relationship with his
wife, including their "sexual problems,11 defendant cannot
now complain that the defense was ineffective because it
was unsuccessful.
Julian,

111 P.2d at 1064 (footnote omitted).15
The instant case, however, is clearly distinguishable

from Julian

and its progeny.

Here, Long maintained his innocence

throughout the investigatory stages and at trial.

He also denied

ever assaulting his ex-wife, Ms. Kastenbader, which testimony was
directly contradicted by Ms. Kastenbader. Thus, credibility before
the jury was of paramount concern because of the conflicting
testimony.16

Accordingly, there was no trial strategy upon which

counsel's failure to preclude the admission of the police report,
which

did not

result

in a conviction,

could

be predicated,

"particularly in the instant case, where [Long]'s character is at
the heart of his defense."
Under Doporto,
probative

of any

Emmett,

839 P.2d

at 786.

the police report was unnecessary and not

element

of the charged

crime. Accordingly,

15

See also State
v. Grueber,
116 P. 2d 70, 76 (Utah Ct.
App.) (counsel's strategy of eliciting from defendant his prior
convictions did not render counsel's performance deficient or
defendant prejudiced), cert,
denied,
783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989).
16

See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785-86; Doporto,
308 UAR at 24.
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935 P.2d at 494,

admission of such evidence was clearly prejudicial to Long,17 since
it made him appear to be a prevaricator, and therefore more
inclined to commit the alleged offense.

The jury could have

reached a different verdict absent the highly prejudicial evidence
and

counsels

ineffectiveness

in

precluding

its

admission.18

Therefore, Long urges this Court to reverse his conviction and
order a new trial.19
B.
DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE BY
NOT OBJECTING TO PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE RELATING TO LONG'S
PRIOR CONVICTIONS.
A.

Relevant

Facts

On cross-examination, the State asked whether Long had
been convicted of felonies.

Long responded that he was convicted

of attempted burglary and kidnapping in 1992. Defense counsel then
objected when the State asked whether the felonies were related
offenses, which objection the court sustained.
B.

Counsel's

Performance

and Prejudice

to Long

Rule 609 governing the admission of prior convictions
provides:
17

See State

v. Gentry,

747 P. 2d 1032 (Utah 1987).

18

See Emmett, 839 P. 2d at 786; cf. Doporto,
935 P. 2d at
494, 308 UAR at 24 (result might have been different absent
admission of inadmissible other bad acts).
19

See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; State v. Mitchell,
779 P.2d
1116, 1122 (Utah 1989) (if the "taint" caused by inadmissible
evidence is sufficient, "it is irrelevant that there is sufficient
untainted evidence to support a verdict").
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(a) General rule: For the purpose
credibility of a witness,

of

attacking

the

(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject
to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year . . ., and evidence that
an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be
admitted if the court determines that the probative value
of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of
a crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or
false statement, regardless of the punishment.
Utah R. Evid. 609.
Character evidence generally is inadmissible to prove
that a person acted in conformity therewith during a particular
occasion.

See

UAR at 21-22.

Utah R.Evid. 404(a); Doporto,

935 P.2d at 490, 308

Nor are other crimes or prior convictions admissible

evidence of conformity under Rule 404.20

Even for a testifying

defendant, for whom Rule 609 does not forbid all use of convictions
to

impeach,

the

rule

requires

that

the

State

show

that

the

probative value of convictions as impeachment evidence outweighs
their prejudicial effects.21
20

See United States
v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir. 1993);
Doporto,
935 P. 2d at 491, 308 UAR at 21-22.
Because Utah's
evidentiary rules are similar to their federal counterparts,
federal interpretations of their rules remain persuasive. State
v.
Teuscher,
883 P.2d 922, 926 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1994;, overruled
on

other

grds,

Doporto,

935 P.2d at 489-90; Salt

Lake City

v.

Holtman,

806 P.2d 235, 237 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
21

See Fed.R.Evid. 609 advisory committee's note ("1990
Amendment") (cited
also in 3 Weinstein's Evidence
§609-01, at 609-3

(1991)).

Accord

United

States

v.

Kiendra,

(1st Cir. 1981).
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663 F.2d 349, 353 n.l

Here, subsection 609(a)(2) clearly is inapplicable, for
Long's prior convictions for attempted burglary and kidnapping do
not

involve

dishonesty

or

falsity.22

Even

under

subsection

609(a)(1), evidence of prior conviction is admissible against a
testifying defendant only after the trial court conducts the
necessary balancing test indicating that the probative value of
such

evidence

outweighs

its

prejudicial

effect,23

Phrased

differently, prior crimes evidence is presumptively prejudicial and
inadmissible absent a showing that it is more probative than
prejudicial.24
Here, defense counsel failed to object to the admission
of this highly damaging evidence.

Under the Strickland

standard,

22

See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989) (attempted
burglary conviction not probative of truthfulness). Cf. State
v.
Brown, 111 P.2d 1093 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (theft not necessarily a
crime involving dishonesty).
23

See Utah R. Evid. 609(a)(1); Holtman,
806 P.2d at 238
(balancing test prerequisite to admissibility of prior convictions;
the trial court erred in not conducting balancing test).
24

Id.;
State
v. Saunders,
699 P.2d 738, (Utah 1985),
limited
on other grds,
Doporto,
935 P.2d at 490-91; State
v.
Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1334 (Utah 1986); Gentry, 141 P.2d at 1032.
It is telling that the State filed no in limine motion to
admit the prior convictions, even though the State filed a motion
for admitting other uncharged crimes. For the reasons discussed
above in Point I (A) , the prior convictions evidence would have
been inadmissible under Rule 404, because they were neither
necessary nor probative of Long's intent in committing the charged
crime.
- 27 -

counsel's performance was clearly deficient.25
P. 2d at 867; Hallett,

796 P. 2d at 705

See Walters,

813

(counsel's performance

deficient in failing to object to admission of hearsay evidence).
No reasonable trial strategy dictates counsel allowing felony
convictions to be admitted against his client without objecting and
therefore mandating the balancing test, as clearly required Rule
609. See Holtman,

806 P.2d at 238. This is especially true in the

instant case, which is premised solely on circumstantial evidence,
where Long's character/credibility becomes his only defense.
id.

See

at 239.
Further, Long suffered prejudice as a result of admitting

the prior convictions evidence. Again, the instant case, which by
the State's own admission, was premised solely on circumstantial
evidence (R.1132 [Tr.417]), hinges significantly on whether the
jury finds Long or Ms. Kastenbader more believable.26

The prior

crimes evidence, coupled with the police report of an assault
allegation, simply provided the jury a reason "to convict [Long]

25

The ABA Standards "furnish a reliable guide for
determining the responsibilities of defense counsel...."
Marzullo
v. State of Maryland, 561 F.2d 540, 545 (4th Cir. 1977). The ABA
Standard Relating to Defense Function provides that a lawyer should
follow proper procedures, entering appropriate motions and
objections to protect the rights of the accused. See ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice,
"The Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (1979 &
Supp. 1986).
26

See Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; of. Doporto,
935 P.2d at
494, 308 UAR at 24 (case hinges on whether jury found defendant or
victim more believable).
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because of bad character rather than because he is shown to be
guilty of the offenses charged."27
C.
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE OF OTHER BAD ACTS PERPETRATED ON PEOPLE OTHER
THAN THE VICTIM CONSTITUTES INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL.
A.

Relevant

Facts

The State charged Long with abusing his son, WJL.
However, two State witnesses, Ms. Kastenbader and Ms. Blackburn,
testified that Long had also been abusive to his daughter, Nessia.
The witnesses also alluded to Long pushing Ms. Kastenbader down the
stairs while she was pregnant.

Defense counsel made no objection

to the admission of this evidence.

On cross-examination, defense

counsel asked whether Ms. Kastenbader had also been abusive to
Nessia. The prosecutor's objection to this question was, however,
sustained by the court. At this point, the court reminded defense
counsel that he had not made any objection to similar inadmissible
other bad acts admitted against Long.

27

Saunders,
699 P. 2d at 741. Accord Doporto,
493, 308 UAR at 22; Emmett, 839 P.2d at 786; Uoltman,
239.
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935 P.2d at
806 P.2d at

B.

Counsel's

Performance

Several

evidentiary

and Prejudice
rules

are

to Long
called

into

play

in

determining the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence.28
Rule 404(b) provides:
Other crimes, wrongs or acts. Evidence of other crimes,
wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity
therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity , or absence of
mistake or accident.
Utah R. Evid. 404(b).

Rule 401 provides that

f,/

Relevant evidence'

means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less than it would be without the evidence."
Evid. 401.

Utah R.

Rule 403 in turn states:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading
the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah R. Evid. 403.

28

See generally
Huddleston v. United States,
485 U.S. 681,
690-91, 108 S. Ct. 1496-1501-02 (1988) (discussing relevant
evidentiary rules); Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence §
2.06 (1984).
See also Doporto,
935 P.2d at 490-494; State
v.
Featherson,
781 P.2d 424, 426-27 (Utah 1989), as limited
by
Doporto,
935 P.2d at 489.
Utah courts look to the interpretation of complimentary
federal evidentiary rules, see State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700
n.6 (Utah Ct. App.), cert,
denied,
859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993), as
limited
by Doporto,
935 P.2d at 484, but are not bound by federal
interpretation, see State v. Thurman, 846 P. 2d 1256, 1265-67 (Utah
1993).
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In considering admissibility of other acts evidence, the
Utah appellate courts have instructed the trial courts to first
determine whether the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b).
The trial court must then carefully consider whether the admission
of the evidence will amount to prejudicial error under Rule 403.29
In addition, the courts have warned of extra-ordinary caution in
admitting other bad acts evidence, stating for example, "We do not
doubt that ' evidence of prior convictions and other bad acts has
tremendous potential to sway the finder of fact unfairly' and
increases the likelihood of conviction."30 Recently, the supreme
court

held

that

evidence

of

other

crimes

perpetrated

by

the

defendant on people other than the victim should not have been
admitted against the defendant because the evidence was unnecessary
and not probative of elements of the charged crime.

See

Doporto,

to

present

935 P.2d at 490-494, 308 UAR at 22-24.
Here,

the

trial

court

allowed

the

State

uncharged misconduct evidence relating to the "statements made by
the defendant to Jamie Conder Kastenbader during the pregnancy, the
victim supposedly falling off the couch, and

... the defendant

29

See Doporto,
935 P.2d at 489-90.
See also
People
v.
Alcala,
685 P.2d 1126, 1140-41 (Cal. 1984) (other bad acts evidence
must be "examined with care."), cert,
denied,
114 S. Ct. 215
(1993) .
30

Gardner,
Alcala,

State
v. Florez,
111 P.2d 452, 459 (Utah 1989)
789 P.2d at 289 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).
685 P.2d at 1141.
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(quoting
Accord

shaking and spanking Nessia, and pulling her hair."

R.140.31

Presumably, the court allowed the other acts evidence under Rule
404(b) to show Long's intent and/or absence of mistake or accident.
See R.109.
First, evidence relating to Long pushing Ms. Kastenbader
was of no probative value regarding his intent in abusing WJL.
Doporto,

935 P. 2d at 491, 308 UAR at 22.

See

Second, that Long may

have told Ms. Kastenbader during her pregnancy to get an abortion
is not indicative of his intent to injure WJL.

See id.

Third,

"intent" and/or "absence of mistake or accident" were not in issue,
because uncontroverted medical evidence readily established that
WJL's injuries were intentionally inflicted and not a result of
mistake or accident.

See R.1009.

Accordingly, the trial court's

decision to admit the evidence was erroneous, because the other bad
acts evidence was unnecessary and not probative of any controverted
element.

See Doporto,

935 P.2d at 491-492, 308 UAR at 22.

Moreover, the State and the trial court have not only
"fallen into the common error of equating acts and circumstances
which are similar in nature with the more narrow common scheme or
plan,"32 but have indeed equated oranges with bananas.

That Long

31

R.140, Addendum III, is the trial court's minute entry
regarding admission of other bad acts.
Because there was no
testimony that Long shook Nessia, no prejudicial error flowed from
the court's decision regarding that evidence.
32

Doporto,

935 P.2d at 491, 3 08 UAR at 22 (quoted case

omitted).
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may have spanked Nessia and pulled her is not sufficiently similar
an act to the brain and fractured ribs injuries WJL sustained, as
to demonstrate absence of mistake or accident, or common plan or
scheme. See

Doporto.

Counsels

failure to object

to the other bad acts

evidence constitutes deficient performance. Indeed the trial court
encapsulates the prejudice attaching to the admission of such
evidence, when it sustained the State's objection to similar
evidence offered against Ms. Kastenbader:
Well, I didn't think Teuscher33 allowed that kind of
inquiry, and I think we are going far beyond the rules of
evidence to allow [other bad acts] with regard to this
particular case. We are not trying or attempting to
retry any kind of a case with regard to Nessia. We are
here with regard to the abuse of a young boy....
R.1022 [Tr. at 109].

It appears from the court's pronouncement

that, had similar objection from the defense been forthcoming, the
court would have granted a motion in limine, or at the minimum
perform the necessary balancing test required by Rule 403 before
admitting other bad acts evidence against Long.34
33

abrogated
1997) .

State v.
by State

Because the

Teuscher,
883 P.2d 922 (Utah Ct. App. 1994),
v. Doporto,
935 P. 2d 484, 308 UAR 18 (S. Ct.

34

In fairness to counsel, the admissibility of other acts
evidence had previously been litigated by the parties in the
mistried case. See R.1022 [Tr. at 109] ("The prior trial [sic] we
went through the whole thing, and the court ruled against us. M ).
However, the prudent course was for counsel to renew the motion at
the retrial to afford the court the opportunity to correct its own
error, as the court obviously did when it precluded the admission
of other acts evidence against Ms. Kastenbader.
See State
v.
Willard,
801 P.2d 189, 190 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing cases
- 33 -

error in admitting the other bad acts evidence was obvious to the
trial court it should also have been obvious to counsel, "who
should have raised an appropriate objection."35
Counsel's performance was deficient for not objecting to
the admission of other acts evidence relating to Nessia.

The

deficient performance was further compounded by the admission of
evidence that Long pushed Ms. Kastenbader while she was pregnant.
Such evidence clearly was irrelevant, and introduced solely to
present Long to the jury as a bad person. See Doporto,

935 P.2d at

492-93, 308 UAR at 22.
In Teuscher,

883 P.2d at 922, referred to at trial by the

parties and the court, a panel of this Court held that incidents of
abuse against other children was admissible to show the identity of
the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime in which a child was
Teuscher,

killed.

however,

contains

no

analysis

of

the

similarities and dissimilarities between the charged and uncharged
conduct to determine if the crimes constitute the defendant's
signature.

See

id.

at 926.36

In addition, Teuscher

had been

(fn. 34, cont'd)

for the proposition that pretrial rulings are not binding on the
trial court in all circumstances; trial court can and should strive
to correct error if properly notified).
35

overruled
1996).

State
v.
on other

Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah Ct. App.),
grds.,
State
v. Labrum, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah

36

Contra Doporto,
935 P. 2d at 492-93, 308 UAR at 22
(finding inadmissible evidence of abuse perpetrated by defendant
against witnesses other than victim because alleged other crimes
not peculiarly distinctive of defendant's "signature").
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uniformly criticized by commentators as a case that defies Utah
supreme court precedent,37 and, as discussed above, it appears that
Teuscher

is now sub silentio

overruled by Doporto.

See 935 P.2d at

489-493, 1997 WL 14805.38
Even assuming that other bad acts were admissible under
Rule 404(b), the evidence should have been subjected to the Rule

?7
Swallows

See, e.g.,
Pendleton, State v. Teuscher:
the Rule, 8 Utah B.J. 13 (Oct. 1995).

The

"Exception"

?8
State v. Winget, 6 Utah 2d 243, 310 P.2d 738 (1957), is
undoubtedly one of Utah's leading cases on the admissibility of
other bad acts evidence. In Winget, the Supreme Court in a rape
prosecution held that evidence of prior nonconsensual sexual acts
of defendant with people other than the victim is inadmissible to
show common plan or scheme. The Winget Court cited its earlier
decision in State v. Williams,
36 Utah 273, 103 P. 250 (1909),
which involved a similar issue, as a case which "has been cited
with approval by respectable authority, and represents the majority
view." Id. at 739 (footnotes omitted). See also Featherson,
781
P.2d at 429.
State v. Cox, 787 P.2d 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), echoes the
Supreme Court's caution in Doporto, Winget and Featherson,
that the
theory of common plan be strictly scrutinized to ensure that
inadmissible evidence is not admitted under the rubric of common
plan. Cox, like Winget and Featherson, involved a defendant who
was convicted of rape. After charges were filed in 1987 against
the defendant on the relevant crime, two other women stepped
forward and reported that defendant had also raped them in 1985.
On the theory that the evidence would show intent, common plan and
knowledge, all three women were allowed to testify. Id. at 5-6.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court
erroneously admitted evidence of other uncharged sexual assaults.
This Court agreed, holding that evidence of nonconsensual sexual
acts with victim and two other women was inadmissible because the
similarities are too common to may rape cases so as to constitute
a signature or modus operandi. See id. at 6. Additionally, the
court found the evidence inadmissable because the other bad acts,
allegedly committed two years earlier, were too remote to be
probative. See id.
Teuscher clearly defies these cases, which require the trial
court to analyze the similarities and dissimilarities between the
charged and uncharged crimes.
- 35 -

403 test.39

In applying Rule 403's balancing test, a court

considers "the similarities between the crimes, the interval of
time that has elapsed

between the crimes, the need

for the

evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to
which

the

evidence

will

rouse

the

jury

to

overmastering

hostility."40
As discussed above, there were no similarities between
the charged crime and the other bad acts.
between them was not close.

The time interval

Further, the other acts evidence was

unnecessary and not probative of Long's intent in abusing WJL.
Moreover, the State had alternative methods of demonstrating that
the perpetrator of the charged offense did so with the requisite
statutory state of mind. And, of course, there is no question that
the jury employed the other acts as evidence of Long's guilt in the
charged crime.

39

See Cox,

As such, the other acts could only have been

787 P. 2d at 5; see

also

Florez,

111 P. 2d at 459

(other bad acts evidence "has tremendous potential to sway the
finder of fact unfairly"). Justice Cardozo once wrote that other
bad acts evidence can be a "peril to the innocent." People
v.
Zackowitz,
254 N.Y. 192, 172 N.E. 466, 468 (1930).
40

State v. Shickles,
760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988) {quoting
E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence,
§ 190, at 565 (3d ed. 1984), as
limited
by Doporto, 935 P.2d at 489. See also State v.
Morrell,
803 P.2d 292, 293-97 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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proffered to "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility,"41 that
Long was a "bad man" and hence guilty as charged,42
This evidence

clearly

undermined

Long's

credibility

before the jury, and impermissibly bolstered Ms. Kastenbader's. As
the supreme court found in

Doporto:

The jury had to assess Doporto's and A.W.'s credibility
and decide whether it believed beyond a reasonable doubt
that the victim was telling the truth. The jury could
have concluded that she was telling the truth without the
prior crime evidence, but we are wholly unable to
conclude that the jury was uninfluenced by that evidence
in assessing defendant's and the victim's credibility.
We cannot say with any assurance that absent the
erroneous admission of he evidence of the prior crime
evidence, the result would have been the same.
Doporto,

935 P.2d at 494, 308 UAR at 24. Accordingly, Long urges

this Court to reverse his conviction and order a new trial.
POINT II
THE COURT FAILED TO NOTICE THE PLAIN ERROR IN ADMITTING
THE EVIDENCE DESCRIBED ABOVE, WHICH FAILURE AFFECTED
LONG'S RIGHT.
Utah R. Evid. 103(d) states:
Plain error.
Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights
although they were not brought to the attention of the
court.

41

Shickles,

760 P. 2d at 295; Doporto,

42

935 P. 2d at 493.

See, e.g.,
State
v. Tarafa,
720 P.2d 1368, 1372 (Utah
1986) (use of other bad acts to show accused's criminal propensity
tends to improperly influence the jury); Cox, 787 P.2d at 6 (same).
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"Plain error" requires that the error be obvious to the trial court
and that the error affect the substantial rights of the accused.43
It should have been obvious to the trial court that evidence
relating to Long's other bad acts, previous convictions, and police
investigation that did not result in a conviction, was prejudicial
and inadmissible.
State

v.

Emmett,

particularly instructive.

839

P.2d

In Emmett,

781

(Utah

1992),

is

the defendant was charged

with sodomy upon his five-year-old son. On direct examination, the
defendant admitted having committed a forgery in which the victim
was his sister. In his closing argument, the prosecutor alluded to
the forgery conviction, stating that the defendant had taken
advantage of his sister and has now taken advantage of his son.
The defendant's counsel, however, failed to make a timely objection
to the comment.
conflicting

testimony

critical issues.
See id.

See

839 P. 2d at 785.

In addition, there was

between the defendant

and his wife on

Accordingly, credibility became very important.

The defendant eventually was convicted, apparently because

the jury believed he did not testify truthfully.

See id.

at 786.

On appeal, the supreme court reversed, noting first that
evidence of a prior conviction is inadmissible under Rules 404 and
609 as substantive evidence of guilt. That defense counsel failed
to object to the comment, the court continued, should not have
43

Eldredge,
773 P.2d at 35; Emmett,
v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097 (Utah 1991).
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839 P.2d at 785;

State

precluded the trial court from noticing this obviously plain error.
See Emmett,

839 P.2d at 785-86.

The court noticed that, because

the case was rather close due to the circumstantial nature of the
State's evidence, the substantive use of the prior conviction must
have tilted the balance in favor of conviction, "particularly ...
where [the defendant]'s character is at the heart of his defense."
Id.

at 786.

Accordingly, the court ordered a new trial.

at 787; see also

Doporto,

See

id.

935 P.2d at 494-95, 308 UAR at 22-24.

As previously argued, evidence of other bad acts, prior
convictions and a police report of an assault which did not result
in a conviction was inadmissible.

The evidence violated Rules 404

and 609" because "they clearly urged the jury to view [Long] as a
person who commits crimes against his family and to use this
characteristic as evidence that [Long abused] his son."

Emmett,

839 P.2d at 786. As also discussed above, except for the aberrant
Teuscher,

numerous cases from this Court and the supreme court have

held that other bad acts evidence of this nature is inadmissible.
Accordingly, it should have been obvious to the trial court that
the jury was being tainted by inadmissible evidence.
As will be demonstrated in detail below in POINT III, the
admission of the evidence was harmful and prejudicial.
Emmettf

Like

the State's case against Long was purely circumstantial,

and there was conflicting testimony regarding the perpetrator of
the charged offenses. Because the case was a close one in light of
the contradictory testimony, the inadmissible character evidence
- 39 -

simply tilted the balance unfavorably against Long.

See

Emmett,

839 P.2d at 786.
POINT III
ERRONEOUS ADMISSIONS OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED EVIDENCE WERE
HARMFUL AND AFFECTED LONG'S SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS.44
Erroneous admissions against Long of the police report of
an assault investigation, prior convictions, and other bad acts
derived from an evidentiary rule, rather than a constitutional,
violation.45

A trial court is regarded as having committed a

reversible, non-constitutional error in admitting evidence if a
substantial

right

of

the

accused

has

been

abridged.46

"A

substantial right is affected by error that had a /material effect7
or 'substantially swayed' the deliberations of the jury. Error not

44

Ineffective assistance of counsel and plain error claims
generally trail each other. See Labrum, 881 P.2d at 906, vacated
on other grds., 925 P. 2d at 937. For both claims the defendant
must demonstrate prejudice by showing that absent counsel or trial
court's claimed error the result of his trial would have been
different. See id.; Labrum, 925 P.2d at 939; Villarreal,
889 P.2d
at 427.
45

States
v. Short,
947 F.2d 1445, 1454 (10th
112 S. Ct. 1680 (1992); Villarreal,
889 P.2d

46

See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Evid. 103(a);
Kotteakos
States,
328 U.S. 750, 760-65 (1946); United States
v.
925 F.2d 1242, 1255 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S.

See United
Cir.), cert,
denied,
at 425-26.
v. United
Jefferson,

884 (1991); Villarreal,

889 P.2d at 425; State

v.

Hamilton,

827

P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed.R.Civ.P.
61; Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a).
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affecting a substantial right is often characterized as harmless."
Graham, § 103.1, at 5-10 (citing cases).47
,f

Normally, the government bears the burden of proving

that a non-constitutional error was harmless."48 Further,
where an error does not impact a federal constitutional
right, the test used for determining an error's
harmfulness is whether there is a reasonable likelihood
that absent the error a different result would have
occurred. This determination should be made on the basis
of the record as a whole.... [T]he determination is best
made by viewing the error in conjunction with other
errors which occurred during the trial.
Emmett,

839 P.2d at 784-785; accord

Villarreal,

889 P.2d at 425.

Here, the question is whether the wrongful admissions of
the

challenged

evidence

affected

Long's

substantial

rights.

Phrased another way, did the admission of the police report of an
assault

investigation, prior

convictions

and

other

evidence substantially sway the jury deliberation?

bad

acts

Although the

State bears the burden of proving harmlessness,49 Long will marshal

47

A "reversible error" or "prejudicial error" is a nonharmless error. See Graham, § 103.1, at 10 n.9. See
generally
Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978) (discussing harmless
error); United States
v. Simpson,
7 F.3d 186 (10th Cir. 1993);
Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785 & n.10.
48

Jefferson,
925 F.2d at 1255 n.15; accord United States
v.
Sides,
944 F.2d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir.), cert,
denied,
112 S. Ct.
604 (1991).
49

See Jefferson,

925 F*2d at 1225 n. 15,
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the evidence to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsel's
deficient performance and/or the trial court's plain error.50
Even considered in the light most favorable to the State,
there is no question the case against Long was not compelling,
although somewhat sufficient to support a conviction. Accordingly,
this case is Emmett revisited.

See Emmett,

839 P.2d at 786.

On Count I, Ms. Kastenbader testified that Long was with
WJL on January 28, when the child was taken to the hospital for
bruises on his face.

Long's explanation that the child must have

been pulled off the couch by his sister was not supported by
medical evidence.

There is evidence also stemming

from Ms.

Kastenbader that Long was home with WJL on February 4, when the
child turned blue and became unconscious, resulting
hospitalized

for

brain

damage.

No

other

in being

witness, however,

corroborated Ms. Kastenbader.
On Count II, Ms. Kastenbader testified that Long agreed
to feed WJL on the night of May 4.

The following day, May 5, Ms.

Kastenbader noticed red dots all over WJL's face, and the child was
eventually admitted to the hospital for broken ribs.

Again, no

other witness corroborated this testimony.

50

See, e.g., United States v. Carter,
973 F.2d 1509, 1516
(10th Cir.), cert,
denied,
113 S. Ct. 1346 (1992) (assessing
unrefuted evidence of overwhelming guilt arrayed against
defendant); Sides,
944 F.2d at 1560 (same); Emmett, 839 P.2d at
785-86 (same).
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On the other hand, Long testified he was not home all day
with WJL on February 4.

He had gone to work with his father that

day, and returned only to be told by Ms. Kastenbader that WJL was
not breathing properly. Long's testimony was corroborated by Mrs.
Long, particularly on the critical issue of whether Long was home
with WJL on February 4.
Long also testified that he had worked the second shift
on May 4, arriving home around 1:15 a.m. and did not see WJL until
the following morning when Ms. Kastenbader told him WJL had red
dots on his face.

Mrs. Long also testified

to seeing Ms.

Kastenbader sit on WJL, apparently because she was upset for not
locating an adult to tend WJL. Medical testimony establishes that
the WJL's injuries on May 5 were consistent with being squeezed or
sat on by an adult.
Neutral witnesses' testimony also weigh heavily in favor
of Long.

Dr. Gully, the forensic psychologist appointed by the

juvenile court to assess the couple, testified that Ms. Kastenbader
told him that Long was never abusive to WJL.

In addition, he

testified that Ms. Kastenbader had described her friend, Maggie
Blackburn, as "two-faced."

Ms. Kastenbader denied ever making

these statements to Dr. Gully, who had no motive to prevaricate.
The guardians ad litem also testified that Ms. Kastenbader showed
no interest in WJL and gave inconsistent statements regarding the
causes of WJL's injuries.

Therefore, the credibility of Ms.

Kastenbader had been called into question before the jury.
- 43 -

Like Emmett,
premised

solely

the entire State's case against Long was

on the testimony

of Ms. Kastenbader, which

testimony was uncorroborated by any direct evidence of guilt and
contradicted by the more neutral witnesses. Thus, the inadmissible
police report, other bad acts, and prior convictions evidence,
became the route through which the State circumvented long-standing
evidentiary principles and spread inappropriate factors before the
jury.

In other

words, without

the

inappropriate

character

evidence, the jury would have been left hopelessly confused as to
who

committed

these

offenses.

If

the

jury

had

found Ms.

Kastenbader less credible, particularly based on the testimony of
Dr. Gully and the guardians ad litem, Long would have been
acquitted.

Looking at the cumulative nature of the errors, there

is little doubt they were harmful and prejudicial.

Given that

evidence of Long's guilt was not strong and the fact that these
errors presented him as less credible than his ex-wife, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a different outcome. See Emmett,
at 786; Doporto,

839 P.2d

935 P.2d at 494, 308 UAR at 24 ("We cannot say

with any assurance that absent the erroneous admission of the
evidence of the prior crime evidence, the result would have been
different.").
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the court placed no limit
on the evidentiary value of the prior convictions and other bad
acts.

Consequently, the jury, contrary to "firmly entrenched ...

rules

of

admissibility,"

was

bound
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to

consider

the

"prior

conviction as substantive evidence of [Long's] guilt."51 "Thus, in
situations where no cautionary instruction is given to the jury,
prejudicial error has intervened."52 Accordingly, Long is entitled
to have his conviction reversed and a new trial ordered.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Independently

or cumulatively,

counsel's

failure to

competently represent Long's interest, as discussed above, was
prejudicial, and thus requires that Long be given a new trial. In
the alternative, it was plain error for the trial court not to have
noticed counsel's errors. Accordingly, this Court should reverse
the decision of the trial court, and remand the case for a new
trial consistent with the Court's decision.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Counsel hereby requests oral argument in this matter, for
the issues raised are of significant constitutional magnitude.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

day of November, 1997.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Wesley Long
By
RONALD J. YENGICH

United
See

States

v. Diaz,

585 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1978).

id.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this
day of November, 1997, to Christine

Soltis, Assistant

Attorney General, Criminal Division, at 236 State Capitol, Salt
Lake City, Utah, 84114.
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ADDENDUM I

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

SIXTH AMENDMENT, U . S .

CONSTITUTION

AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, U.S. CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in *ny way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United^States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions
and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to' enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.

ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a
speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or
district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed,
and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any
accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed.
The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise
provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute
or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to
determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is
allowed as defined by statute or rule.
1904

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 7 6-5-109
7G-5-109. Child abuse.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of age
or less.
(b) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child,
including:
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin;
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion;
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's
health or welfare and which is not a serious physical
injury as defined in this section.
(c) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's
health, or which involves physical torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a
substantial risk of death to the child, including:
(i) fracture of any bone or bones;
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or
causing the child's head to impact with an object or
surface;
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon
the skin or body of the child;
(iv) any injury caused by use of a deadly or dangerous weapon;
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the same person, either at the same
time or on different occasions;
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body;
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay
or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's
ability to function;
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ;
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the
child's life.
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child
\B guilty of an oflense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
felony of the second degree;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third
degree;
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or,
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an
offense as follows:
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a
class A misdemeanor;
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor;
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a
class C misdemeanor.
(4) Criminal actions under this section may be prosecuted
in the county or district where the oflense is alleged to have
been committed, where the existence of the offense is discovered, where the victim resides, or where the defendant resides.
1992

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, RULE 3 0

Rule SO. Errors and defects.
(a) Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does
not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded.
(b) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of
the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after
such notice, if any, as the court may order.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 103

Rule 103. Rulings on evidence.
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless
a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of
record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of proof. In case the ruling is one excluding
evidence, the substance of the evidence was made known
to the court by offer or was apparent from the context
within which questions were asked.
(b) Record of offer and ruling. The court may add any
other or further statement which shows the character of the
evidence, the form in which it was offered, the objection made,
and the ruling thereon. It may direct the making of an offer in
question and answer form.
(c) Hearing of jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be
conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible evidence from being suggested to the jury by any means,
such as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing of the jury.
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes taking
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although
they were not brought to the attention of the court.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 403

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 4 04

Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove
conduct; exceptions; other crimes.
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent
trait of character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait
of character of the victim of the crime offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim
ofTered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character
of a witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 607

Rule 607. Who may impeach.
The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party,
including the party calling the witness.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 608

Rule 608. Evidence of character and conduct of witness.
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by
evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to
these limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character
for truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful
character is admissible only after the character of the witness
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation
evidence or otherwise.
(b) Specific instances of conduct. Specific instances of
the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or
supporting the witness* credibility, other than conviction of
crime as provided in Rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into
on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness* character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2)
concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of
another witness as to which character the witness being
cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any
other witness, does not operate as a waiver of the accused's or
the witness* privilege against self-incrimination when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
(c) Evidence of bias. Bias, prejudice or any motive to
misrepresent may be shown to impeach the witness either by
examination of the witness or by evidence otherwise adduced.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE, RULE 609

Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of
crime.
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has
been convicted of a crime shall be admitted, subject to
Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which
the witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused
has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false
statement, regardless of the punishment.
(b) Time limit. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is
not admissible if a period of more than ten years has elapsed
since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness
from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever
is the later date, unless the court determines, in the interests
of justice, that the probative value of the conviction supported
by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its
prejudicial effect. However, evidence of a conviction more than
ten years old as calculated herein, is not admissible unless the
proponent gives to the adverse party sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to provide the adverse
party with a fair opportunity to contest the use of such
evidence.
(c) Effect of pardon, annulment, or certificate of rehabilitation. Evidence of a conviction is not admissible under
this rule if (1) the conviction has been the subject of a pardon,
annulment, certificate of rehabilitation, or other equivalent
procedure based on a finding of the rehabilitation of the person
convicted, and that person has not been convicted of a subsequent crime which was punishable by death or imprisonment
in excess of one year, or (2) the conviction has been the subject
of a pardon, annulment, or other equivalent procedure based
on a finding of innocence.
(d) Juvenile adjudications. Evidence of juvenile adjudications is generally not admissible under this rule. The court
may, however, in a criminal case allow evidence of a juvenile
adjudication of a witness other than the accused if conviction
of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of
an adult and the court is satisfied that admission in evidence
is necessary for a fair determination of the issue of guilt or
innocence.
(e) Pondoncy of appeal. The pendency of an appeal therefrom does not render evidence of a conviction inadmissible.
Evidence of the pendency of an appeal is admissible.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)

ADDENDUM II

JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT
ORDER

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

MINUTE ENTRY - JUDGMENT,
SENTENCE AND COMMITMENT
(JURY VERDICT)
CASE NO. 941400117 (V)
DATE: September 5, 1996

WESLEY JAMES LONG
Defendant.

JUDGE: BOYD L. PARK
REPT. BY: Richard C. Tatton, CSR
CLERK: NAH

This matter came before the Court for pronouncement of judgment and sentence.
Assistant Attorney General Craig Barlow appeared for and on behalf of the State of Utah.
The defendant was present. Appearing for the defendant was Ronald Yengich.
The defendant was ordered to undergo and evaluation at the diagnostic unit at the
Utah State Prison on the 7th day of June, 1996. The diagnostic unit sent this court a letter
indicating they were unable to complete an evaluation because the defendant would not admit
his guilt.
Mr. Yengich addressed the court regarding sentencing. The defendant addressed
the court. Mr. Barlow responds. Mr. Yengich responds.
The Court having reviewed the presentence investigation report and being fully
advised in the premises, now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence and
Commitment:
JUDGMENT
On the 8th day of February, 1996, the defendant having been found guilty by a jury
of the offenses of Counts I and II: Child Abuse, Second Degree Felonies , as charged in
the Information; the Court finding no legal reason why judgment should not be pronounced,

and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, it is ordered
and adjudged that the defendant is guilty as charged and convicted.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the defendant
Wesley James Long is sentenced to be confined in the Utah State Prison for an indeterminate
term of not less than one (1) nor more than fifteen (15) years on each count. Said sentences
are to run concurrent one with the other.
COMMITMENT
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Warden of the Utah State Prison to
be transported to the Utah County Jail and released for a period of 30 days on the bond
previously posted in this case. The defendant is ordered to return to the Utah County Jail on
Monday, October 7, 1996, at 8:00 a.m. to be transported to the Utah State Prison in
execution of this judgment and sentence.
Mr. Yengich requests that the court consider a 402 motion based on the
circumstances of the case. Mr. Barlow objects. The Court requests that counsel brief the
issue and file their memorandums within two weeks so the court may rule before October 7,
1996.
RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to the Utah Code Annotated 77-27-13(5), the Court provides the following
information:
(a) Terms for which the offender, in the opinion of the Court, should be
imprisoned: As prescribed by the Utah Sentencing and Release Guidelines.
(b) Character of the offender:

Unknown

(c) Aggravating Circumstances:

Unknown

(d) Mitigating Circumstances:

Unknown

Dated this 5th day of September, 1996.
BY/TflE CPURT-

i^er~~~es*Z&
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ADDENDUM III

MINUTE ENTRY RE: ADMISSION OF
OTHER ACTS

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah
CARM* B.SMITH, Clerk

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTE ENTRY - JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff,
CASE NO: 941400117

vs.
WESLEY JAMES LONG,
Defendant.

DATE:

October 23 - 25, 1995

JUDGE:

BOYD L. PARK

REPT BY: Vonda Bassett, CSR and
Creed Barker, CSR
CLERK:

NAH

This matter is before the Court for a jury trial. Assistant Attorney General, Craig
Barlow, is present for the State of Utah. The defendant is present and represented by Danny
Frazier.
Counsel meets with the court in chambers regarding the State's 404(b) motion. Mr.
Barlow addresses the court regarding that motion. Mr. Frazier objects. The Court grants
the State's 404(b) motion in regard to the statements made by the defendant to Jaime Conder
Kastenbader during the pregnancy, the victim supposedly falling off the couch, and as to the
defendant shaking and spanking Nessia, and pulling her hair.
Court proceeds with the jury panel seated and all parties present and ready to
proceed.
The jurors are qualified for term and are as follows: Thad S, Burr, Christopher
L.A. Meek, Joyce C. Oliphant, Aria J.N. Wilding, Betsy M. Devincent
The jurors are sworn as to their competency.
Court recesses to meet with counsel in chambers. Mr. Frazier makes a motion to
recuse the jury panel due to a statement made out loud by juror number one. Mr. Barlow
objects. The Court denies Mr. Frazier's motion to recuse the jury panel.
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ADDENDUM IV

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

P I L E D 7-

m~<n

J ud c,a,D,8,r,c
*coV r t ' l
e ?S^ c '
or Utah County, state of III«I.

RONALD J. YENGICH, #3580
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant
175 East 400 South, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 3 55-03 20
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 941400117

WESLEY JAMES LONG,
Defendant.

Judge Ray M. Harding, Sr,

The above-entitled matter came on for an evidentiary
hearing on defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment or for New Trial
and defendant's 402 motion.

Assistant Attorney General Craig L.

Barlow was present on behalf of the State of Utah; the defendant
was present

in person and represented

by counsel, Ronald

J.

Yengich.
Counsel met with the Court in chambers.
The Court indicated that counsel had filed extensive
briefs on both issues and felt that the issues had been fully
covered.

Therefore, the Court made its ruling based upon the

memoranda received from counsel.

-0/V

-f -*

The Court denies defendant's Motion to Arrest Judgment or
for New Trial.

The Court finds that no plain error existed or

ineffective assistance of counsel.
Mr. Yengich makes a Motion for Certificate of Probable
Cause pending the appeal and requests that bail be set in the
amount previously posted by the defendant.
The
comments.

Court

prefaces

the

following

ruling

with

some

The Court grants defendant's Motion for Certificate of

Probable Cause.

The Court sets bail at $10,000 cash or bond as

previously posted.
SIGNED BY MY HAND this /*T

day of

\j^Ut^

irg®^

- 2 -

, 1997.

